In this paper we present a model of war between two rational and completely informed players. We show that in the absence of binding agreements war can be avoided in many cases by one player transferring money to the other player. In most cases, the "rich" country transfers part of her money to the "poor" country.
Introduction
War has played an important role in human history. Social scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to show how rational and fully informed players can engage in war, e.g. Bueno de Mesquita (1981) , O'Neill (1990), Hirshleifer (1991) , Skaperdas (1992) , Sánchez-Pagés (2006) and Jackson and Morelli (2007) . This approach leaves aside many relevant factors such as irrational or incompletely informed players, religion, politics, ethnicity, etc. But by focussing on such a stylized world, it captures the core of many con ‡icts, namely rational interest in some valuable resource. 1 On the contrary, the question of which kind of agreements can prevent war -which is a wasteful way to settle con ‡icts-has been relatively neglected. A di¢ culty here is how to explain the commitment of both parties to the agreed upon course of action. On the one hand, contracts between two sovereign states are, usually, not legally enforceable. 2 On the other hand, reputation e¤ects can only arise under incomplete information or in in…nitely repeated games (Fearon [1995] , p. 409).
There is ample historical evidence of such agreements: Roman emperors used to buy peace with invaders, e.g. Alaric was paid 5,000 pounds of gold, 30,000 pounds of silver plus other valuables in return for calling o¤ the siege of Rome in AD 409 (Gibbons [1776 (Gibbons [ -1788 , Chap. XXXI). Attila obtained 13.000 pounds of gold during the period AD 440-450 from the eastern provinces of the Roman empire to stop him from invading them (Keegan [1994] , p. 183). Both Alaric and Attila knew Rome very well.
The …rst served in the Roman army and the second spent time in Rome as a hostage.
The eastern Roman emperor Justinian and its Persian counterpart Chosroes negotiated a long series of agreements, some of which were upheld, e.g. the truce in AD 541 in which the Persians agreed not to attack Byzantine territory for the next …ve years in 1 The connection between war and games was already noticed by Clausewitz ([1832] Chapter 1, end of paragraph 21): "War is akin to a card game". 2 This is one of the di¤erences between legal batles and wars: In the former pre-trial agreements are enforceable and in the later this is not necessarily the case. For instance in Alesina-Spolaore (2005) war may arise from a surprise attack during negotiations.
return for 5,000 pounds of gold (Evans [1998] ). An "everlasting" peace agreement, though, lasted only for 10 years. Viking kings used to be "bought o¤" in tenth century
England. They also received Normandy from the king of France in return for lifting the siege of Paris (Sykes, 2006, p. 263) . Christian kingdoms used to extort the Moorish kingdoms in eleventh century Spain with tributes called Parias in return for peace, but two centuries earlier similar tributes were paid the other way around (Nelson [1979] ).
The Song empire appeased the Tangut and the Liao empires with gold, silk, brocade and tea (http://www.chinaknowledge.de/History/Song/song-event.html). Tribal wars in Africa were avoided by paying slaves as tribute (Nunn, [2007] p. 6), etc. 3 In many cases, agreements took place among people who knew each other well and with whom similar agreements -not all of them upheld-were struck in the past. Thus, it would be convenient to have an explanation for such agreements that does not rely exclusively on reputation e¤ects or binding agreements.
Consider the following mechanism. Before war is waged, the potentially attacked player (the "prey") gives some resources to the potentially attacking player (the "predator") with a double target: to compensate him for the expected spoils of war and to make him so rich that he is no longer interested in waging war. Why is this so? Because of two reasons: on the one hand, the prey is slimmer after the transfer so the expected revenue from attacking will be less than before; on the other hand the predator has more to lose after the transfer because he is now richer. What is not so clear is that the prey is better o¤, since in some cases peace is bought so dearly that war might be preferable. The objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of such agreements in a simple model with two …nitely-lived and fully informed players.
The game is played as follows: In the …rst stage transfers are made. In the second stage players decide simultaneously if they declare war or not. If one of them declares war, war occurs. In the third stage, if there is war, each player decides the war e¤ort.
In the last stage the outcome of the war is determined and the winner takes all. 4 Thus 3 There are well-known cases where the policy of appeasement by means of transfers failed, i.e. the concessions of France and Great Britain to Adolf Hitler in the 1930. 4 Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003, p. 417) consider three outcomes following the defeat of a nation: con…scation of resources, to install a puppet king and to alter the institutions in our model is close to Clausewitz's (1976) concept of absolute war. 5 We assume that the probability of winning war is a function of war e¤orts and two parameters: the (relative) military pro…ciency of Player 1 and the responsiveness of the probability of winning war to war e¤orts. The latter is an inverse measure of the role of chance in war. For simplicity, we assume that a …xed proportion of war e¤orts can be recovered by the winner, so a …xed proportion of resources are lost in the war.
Players are endowed with a resource that can be devoted to war e¤ort or consumed.
The resources of Player 1 are larger than those of Player 2 so the …rst (resp. second) player will be called the rich (resp. poor ) player. Thus in our model there are four parameters: military pro…ciency, the role of chance in war, the (marginal) cost of war and the inequality of resources between players.
We start analyzing in Section 3 the "canonical" case where both players are equally pro…cient and the probability of winning the war is proportional to war e¤orts. In this case, the unique source of asymmetry among players is derived from the di¤erences in resources. In absence of transfers, only the poor player has incentives to attack when inequality of resources is large and the marginal cost of war is not small. This occurs when the poor player uses all his resources in the war but the rich player does not (we say that the poor player is constrained but the rich player is unconstrained). The role of inequality of resources is clear: The poor player attacks in the hope of becoming rich. 6 However, the e¤ect of the marginal cost of war is contrary to what intuition suggests.
A high cost of war may yield incentives to the poor player to attack since the resources used in war by the rich player are decreasing with the cost of the war. Thus, when this cost is high, the chances for the poor player to win the war are greater than when this cost is small. We show that in this case transfers avoid war unless inequality of resources is very large. The transfer from the rich to the poor country reduces resource inequality the defeated country. Here we only consider the …rst alternative. 5 See Smith and Stam (2004) for a model of war more akin to Clausewitz's limited wars. 6 This provides an explanation of the uneven contenders paradox, raised by Clausewitz (1832), where a weak country initiates war, even though it has a small probability of winning the war. In the words of Adam Smith (1776, p.659) "An industrious, and upon that account a wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked."
and induces a peaceful behavior in the poor country. 7 In any other case, peace is an equilibrium without transfers: If both players are unconstrained, war entails a small expected gain and a large loss of resources because in this case the marginal cost of war is larger than 0.5. If both agents are constrained, war entails too much destruction because both players commit all their resources to the con ‡ict and since the probability of winning is proportional to war e¤orts, in the most favorable case (zero marginal cost of war) they can only expect to gain exactly what they had before the war.
In Section 4, we assume that the probability of winning is less responsive to war e¤orts to what it was assumed in Section 3. This gives more incentives to the poor player to start a war. Consequently, war may occur when both players are unconstrained or when both are constrained: In the limit, when war is just a fair lottery, war occurs even when the di¤erence in resources is arbitrarily small. We show that in both cases, if inequality of resources is not very large, transfers from the rich to the poor country avoid war. A transfer acts as a costless lottery that leaves both players better o¤.
In Section 5 we analyze the case where the rich country has an advantage in military pro…ciency. This advantage gives incentives to the rich player to attack in the absence of transfers, as in Bueno de Mesquita (1981, pp. 129 and 155). For this to occur its military pro…ciency should be high, the resources of the poor can not be too small (so the potential loot is large) and the marginal cost of war has to be small (so the winner can recoup a sizeable part of war e¤orts). A large inequality protects the poor player from an attack by the rich player, since this player has little to gain. Transfers from the poor to the rich avoid war when the resources of the poor are su¢ ciently large.
Summing up, we …nd that the transfer mechanism avoids war in a large number of cases showing that peaceful agreements may be reached in absence of commitment.
This agrees with the observation of Morrow (2008) that "interstate war is very rare"
and that "most disputes are resolved without escalating to war" (op.cit. pp. 11-13).
Relationship with the Literature
Hirshleifer (1991), proposed a model where poor players often improve their position relative to rich ones. He called this the Paradox of Power. This is close to our observation 7 An implication of this is that it may be not a good idea to make a poor country even poorer because this may make war unstoppable.
that a high cost of war may yield incentives to the poor player to attack. But our models are di¤erent. Firstly Hirshleifer does not study the incentives to declare war he just assumes that there is war. Secondly, in his model there is production and the marginal cost of war is one. 8 Thirdly, he does not discuss the role of transfers in bringing peace. 227-8) and they do not consider the possibility to make transfers that may stop war.
Ponsatí (2004) studies bilateral con ‡icts that a¤ect the welfare of a third party.
The con ‡ict takes the form of a war of attrition, and intervention is modelled as the possibility that the stakeholder aids the agreement with transfers to the contenders. In this case, the source of money is external to the con ‡ict.
Jackson and Morelli (2007) study how the decisions to go to war depend on the political bias of the decision makers. Political bias refers to the discrepancy between the interests of decision makers and citizens. They do not distinguish between war e¤ort and resources and thus the consideration of the constraints of resources, that plays a prominent role in our analysis, is absent there. The center of this paper is the case where both parties can commit. They also give some results on the non commitment case. Firstly, if the decision makers are unbiased, two countries may decide to go to war depending on the responsiveness of the probability of winning the war to the di¤erence in resources. This is very close to our Proposition 4. Secondly, "it is possible that too high a transfer will lead to war while a lower transfer will avoid a war". This is because the larger transfer will increase the probability that the poor country wins the war.
Thirdly, their Proposition 4 asserts that "if the probability of winning is proportional to relative wealths..... two.. countries will never go to war if they can make transfers to each other (even without commitment)". The reason is that if the winning probabilities are proportional no country wants to go to war in the absence of transfers, which is our Proposition 1. Thus, our paper complements and extends their …ndings in the case of non commitment.
Finally, the issue of non-commitment has been used to explain war, see Gar…nkel and Skaperdas (2007), Section 5.2 and the references therein. In this approach countries can only commit to short-run peace. In each period, if con ‡ict is a possible outcome, each country incurs in a cost by building weapons. Here, the incentive for war comes from the fact that eliminates the need to build weapons in each period.
Other mechanisms of altering initial conditions considered in other parts of the literature (like burning money, transfer and destruction of endowments or issuing patents)
are discussed in a companion paper, Beviá and Corchón (2008) .
The rest of the paper goes as follows. We present our model in Section 2. In Sections 3, 4 and 5, we analyze the incentives for both players to go to war and when war can be avoided by transfers. Section 6 concludes the paper and suggests some avenues of further research. All the proofs are gathered in an appendix.
The Model
There are two players with resources V 1 and V 2 . W.l.o.g. we will assume that V 1 > V 2 .
They play the following game.
In the …rst stage, each player may transfer part of his resources to the other player. 9 In the second stage, each player decides whether to declare war on the other player or not. If a player declares war, war occurs. If both abstain from declaring war, peace results.
In the third stage, if there is peace, the game ends. Payo¤ to player i is his resource V i , i = 1; 2 plus the net transfer received in the …rst stage: If there is a war, each player commits part of his resources to the war e¤ort, denoted by e i , i = 1; 2: It is assumed that there is no outside credit and therefore no player can use in the war more than his available resources. 10 In the fourth stage, war is waged. The outcome is partially determined by nature and partially determined by war e¤orts. 11 Thus in our model, the wealth of a nation does not translate automatically into military capabilities as in Bueno de Mesquita (1981, p.
102) and Jackson and Morelli (2007).
If p i is the probability that player i = 1; 2 wins the war, we assume that
and p 2 = e 2 e 1 + e 2 ; 2 (0; 1); 0 1.
The functions in (2.1) are called contest success functions (CSF): The parameter is a measure of the war skills of Player 1. When = 1, we will say that the CSF are symmetric. The parameter measures the sensitivity of the probability of winning war to the e¤orts. When = 0, the outcome of war is purely random. When = 1, we will say that the CSF are proportional.
A motivation for this functional form is that it seems reasonable to require that the 9 We describe payo¤-relevant events only. But the …rst stage can be envisioned as a summit between the leaders of the two countries where they sign a non-agression treaty and, under the CSF is homogeneous of degree zero, so winning probabilities do not depend on how resources are measured (pounds or francs, number or thousands of soldiers, etc.). Clark
and Riis (1998), following Skaperdas (1996) , have shown that under certain assumptions the only functional form that is homogeneous of degree zero is precisely the one above.
We will assume that there is a winner who takes all, i.e. the war does not end in a stalemate. Assume that a …xed proportion of the war e¤ort, say k, can not be recovered by the winner, with 0 k 1. The parameter k is the marginal cost of e¤ort.
For simplicity we assume, as it is customary in the literature, that players are riskneutral. 12 Thus, the payo¤ of, say Player 1, if he wins the contest is
and zero otherwise. Let V V 1 + V 2 . Expected payo¤ of player i; denoted by E i , is
Finally we assume that information is complete and that the equilibrium concept is subgame perfection.
The game is characterized by four parameters, V 2 =V; k; ; : In order to analyze how the solution of the game depends on those parameters, we will proceed as follows.
First, in Section 3 we solve the case where CSF are proportional and symmetric. In Section 4 we consider CSF which are symmetric but non proportional and in Section 5
we consider CSF which are non symmetric but proportional. The analysis in these last two sections complements the one in Section 3 and allows to highlight the role of and respectively.
The Game with Symmetric and Proportional CSF ( = 1; = 1)
In this case, the CSF reads
Thus, the expected payo¤ of player i, is
We solve the game backwards. Since no player has to move in the fourth stage, let us begin by analyzing the third stage. Setting In the interval where Player 1 becomes constrained by his resources, his best reply becomes totally ‡at (a vertical line in the case of Player 2). Thus, it is clear that we have only the following possibilities: both players are unconstrained; both players are constrained or just one player is constrained. Let us analyze each of these cases in turn.
Both Players Are Unconstrained
This case arises i¤ the resources in the hands of each player are larger than the solution to (3.3), i.e. V 4kV 1 and V 4kV 2 ; or equivalently, 1 4k
Notice that this case can only occurs for k 0:5: For those values of k, 
Then, equilibrium occurs at
Payo¤s amount to
Player 1 is Unconstrained and Player 2 is Constrained
This case arises i¤ the resources in the hand of Player 2 are smaller than the solution to (3.3), i.e. V > 4kV 2 ; and the best reply of Player 1 to
Equilibrium occurs at
(3.10)
Both Players are Constrained
This case arises i¤
We see that equilibrium occurs at e 1 = V 1 and e 2 = V 2 : (3.12)
In Figure 2 below, the increasing line corresponds to We are now ready to analyze the second stage of the game by comparing the expected payo¤s obtained under war with the payo¤s in the case of peace, assuming that no transfers have been made in the …rst stage. Then, peace occurs i¤ E i V i , i = 1; 2.
If both players are unconstrained,
kV 2 ; since k 1; E i V i for all i = 1; 2: Thus, war in this case is not pro…table.
If both players are constrained, E i = V i (1 k) for all i = 1; 2; which con…rms that war is not pro…table either. We record these …ndings in the following proposition. Proposition 1. If both players are unconstrained or both players are constrained, no war is declared in equilibrium in the absence of transfers.
The interpretation of this result is the following: In case 3.1 both players are not very di¤erent and the technology of recovery of the spoils of war is not very e¢ cient (i.e. k larger than :5). Therefore, aggression does not pay because it entails a small expected gain and a large loss of resources. War in case 3.3 entails too much destruction because both players commit all their resources to the con ‡ict, and since the probability of winning is proportional to war e¤orts, in the most favorable case (k = 0) they can only expected to gain their initial resources.
The analysis of Case 3.2 is far more interesting. Recall that in this case,
and
The inequality
for all k 2 [0; 1]: Thus, it is never in the interest of Player 1 to declare war. However, inequality (3.15) not always hold, thus if
Player 2 has an incentive to declare war. This result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Case 3.2 holds. In the absence of transfers, war is declared by
For any other values of the parameters, peace is the equilibrium outcome of the game.
Proposition 2 says that if Player 1 is su¢ ciently rich with respect to Player 2, the poor player has an incentive to declare war. The poor player declares war in the hope of becoming rich. But the e¤ect of k is contrary to what intuition might suggest, which is that when the marginal cost of war is high, war would not pay o¤. This counterintuitive result comes from the fact that the resources committed to war by Player 1 decrease with k and, thus, the larger k the larger is the probability that Player 2 wins the war.
This makes the payo¤ for Player 2 in the case of war increasing in k and explains the result.
In Figure 3 below we picture the function Now we are ready for the analysis of the …rst stage of the game. In particular we look for a transfer T from Player 1 to Player 2 with the following properties:
1. Before the transfer, equilibrium means war. That is, case 3.2 occurs and war is declared by Player 2,
2. After the transfer, both players are better o¤ than if there had being a war. That is,
where the …rst (resp. the second) inequality corresponds to the expected value of Player 2 (resp. Player 1) before the transfer being smaller than his resources after the transfer.
3. After the transfer, peace is an equilibrium outcome.
Either we are in Case 3.1, i.e., 1 4k
or in Case 3.2 with peace, 3.19) or in Case 3.3,
If T satis…es Conditions 1, 2 and 3, we will say that a peace agreement is feasible.
In Figure 3 we visualize the possible cases that can occur. For k = 1; after the transfer we can only be in Case 3.1, the area above the decreasing line. 
In Figure 3 is clear that the minimal transfer that will avoid war by Player 2 should be such that this player is indi¤erent between war and pease, that is
But we have to be sure that Player 1 will be better o¤ after the transfer than if there had being a war, which is equivalent to require that
But this will only happen if
We show in Lemma 4 that x 1 (k) exists and
So, x 1 (k) can be interpreted as the minimal relative resources in hands of Player 2 that will make Player 1 be indi¤erent between making the transfer or go to war in the …rst place. If the relative resources in hands of Player 2 are less than this quantity, the required transfer becomes too expensive for Player 1: In the following Proposition we formalize these arguments. 
The minimal transfer,T ; that avoids war is such that it makes Player 2 be indifferent between war and peace, that is, Figure 4 summarizes the above result. The area below the dot line (x 1 (k)) represents the area where a peace agreement is impossible. If resource inequality is very large, negotiations cannot avoid war because the minimal transfer that will stop Player 2 to declare war is too expensive for Player 1. Above the x 1 (k) line, peace is possible. The transfer that avoids war increases with k; thus re ‡ecting that, as we remarked before, the war e¤ort of Player 1 decreases with k: So a high k increases the probability that Player 2 wins the war and therefore increases the transfer that makes Player 2 peaceful.
It is worth noting that in the worst situation, a peace agreement can be reached when the resources of the poorest player are at least 2.9 per cent of the total resources: Again, an idea of the probability that war will arise when transfers can be made is obtained assuming that k 4. The Game with a Symmetric CSF ( = 1; 0 1)
In this section we consider a generalized symmetric form of the CSF used in the previous section. We will see that symmetry in the CSF implies that the rich player never has an incentive to declare war. But, contrary to what happened in the previous section, there may be an incentive to wage war even when both players are unconstrained and their resources are very similar or when both players are constrained. In the …rst case, a peaceful arrangement (with the appropriate transfer) is always possible. Unfortunately, in the second case there are instances in which no transfers can stop war.
Suppose that the CSF is of the following form p i = e i e 1 + e 2 ; i = 1; 2 with 0 1.
This is the CSF proposed by Tullock (1980) that has been ubiquitously used in the literature. It reduces to the form postulated in Section 3 when = 1. Now expected payo¤s for player i; denoted by E i , assuming that war has been declared are
(V k(e 1 + e 2 )):
Noting that p 2 = 1 p 1 we have that
(e 1 + e 2 ) 2 (V k(e 1 + e 2 )) (1 p 1 )k: The solution to (4.5) is,
: (4.6)
Both players are unconstrained
This case arises if the following inequality holds,
Since V 1 > V 2 , if the second inequality holds, the …rst inequality also holds.
For war to be a rational option, we need the following:
We …rst notice that it is impossible that both inequalities occur, because adding them up we get V +1 > V which is impossible. This implies that Player 1 has no incentive to go to war because if it had, Player 2 would also have incentives to declare war (since
. Thus, we are left with the case where only the second inequality in (4.8) holds, so the second country has an incentive to go to war. Notice that, contrarily to the case in which = 1, war is now possible: Indeed, the occurrence of war is equivalent to
which is possible whenever < k: Our next result summarizes this discussion. We see that the occurrence of war depends on several factors. First, the probability of winning the war should not depend very much on war e¤orts relative to the marginal cost of war, k. For a small the poor player has a chance of winning the war without much e¤ort which implies a sizeable loot should war be won. Second, the ratio of the resources of Player 2 with respect to those of Player 1 should not be too high, -because otherwise Player 2 risks a lot-nor too low, because in this case Player 2 is constrained.
An important consequence of this result is that when ! 0; war is possible for any value of V 2 =V . In other words, here war is possible even in the absence of inequality. This is because when the success of war is not very sensitive to war e¤orts, both players use only a small part of their resources in war and the loot of the winner is considerable.
Let us study equilibrium in the …rst stage of the game. Consider the minimum transfer that leaves Player 2 indi¤erent between peace and war, namely
Notice thatT is always smaller than V 1 (if it were not,
which is impossible). After the transfer, both players will be better o¤ than if they had had a war, Player 1 will still be unconstrained and no one will have incentives to declare war. The following proposition proves that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 5. When the CSF are of the form (4.1) and both players are unconstrained, a peace agreement is feasible. The minimal transfer that avoids war is such that it makes Player 2 be indi¤erent between war and peace, that is
The interpretation of this result is that, as we saw before, war is a rational option for Player 2 when it is a kind of lottery, i.e. the outcome of the war does not depend much on war e¤orts. But in this case a transfer acts as a costless lottery that leaves both players better o¤.
Both Players are Constrained

This case arises i¤
> 0, or equivalently:
Notice …rst that Player 1 constrained (inequality (4.11)) implies Player 2 constrained (inequality (4.12)). Notice also that no player is constrained if = 0:
Since the probability of winning for Player 1 is increasing with ;
which implies that Player 1 has no incentive to declare war.
However, contrary to the case in which = 1, if > 1 war is possible. For Player 2
to have an incentive to declare war, E i > V 2 should hold. Combining this inequality with (4.11),
(1 k): (4.14)
Notice …rst that if = 1; the above inequality never holds (as we proved in Section 3).
But when k = 0 and 2 (0; 1); the above condition always holds. Firstly because for k = 0; both players are constrained no matter how the resources are distributed (see conditions (4.11) and (4.12)). Secondly; V 2 =(V 1 + V 2 ) is decreasing with ; thus the second inequality in (4.14) is trivially satis…ed: So in those situations Player 2 always has an incentive to declare war and no transfer will avoid war. Since k = 0; the minimal transfer that will stop Player 2 from declaring war should be such that resources of both players are equalized. But then, Player 1 will not be better o¤ because before the transfer he expects in the worse case ( = 0) half of the resources.
In general, the minimal transfer that will stop Player 2 from declaring war should be such that makes this Player indi¤erent between peace or war after the transfer. But, in some situations (like when k = 0); this transfer is too expensive for Player 1 and he will not accept it. The transfer will be feasible if the resources in hands of Player 2 are above certain threshold (V 2 (k; )) 13 : The following Proposition summarizes this result.
Details are given in the appendix. 4.3. Player 1 is Unconstrained and Player 2 is Constrained.
As in the previous cases, we will show here that Player 1 has no incentive to start a war. We can conclude that symmetry of the CSF implies that the rich player never has an incentive to declare war.
This case arises if V 2 < e 2 and
; and (4.15)
The optimal e¤ort of Player 1 in case of war is the solution of
Let e 1 be the solution of (4.17). The expected payo¤ of Player 1 is
Since e 1 < V 1 ,
is increasing with ; thus,
Thus, Player 1 has no incentive to declare war. In the following Proposition we prove under what conditions Player 2 declares war.
Proposition 7. When the CSF are of the form (4.1), Player 1 is unconstrained and
Player 2 is constrained, in the absence of transfers, war is declared by Player 2 i¤
We leave the analysis of this case here because it is qualitatively identical to the case when = 1:
To close this section, we illustrate in Figure 5 the special case of = 0:5: We have plotted the areas where war is possible in the absence of transfers. Comparing the results with the case of = 1; we see that as gamma decreases, war is cheaper, and therefore the area where war occur before transfers increases. Also, the area were both agents are unconstrained increases. In the limit, when = 0; the only possible case is that both players are unconstrained and war is always declared by Player 2 independently of his relative resources. But, in this case, the expected value of the war for both players is just half of total resources, and both agents will be indi¤erent between a transfer that equalizes resources and war. In general, for any given ; whenever player are unconstrained a peace agreement is always feasible. Although we do not have o¤ered a complete picture in this Section, we can guess that when the chances of winning the war becomes more and more random (the area where both players are unconstrained increases), a peace agreement becomes easier even though before transfers the chances of declaring war are bigger. In this section we consider an asymmetric CSF in which the rich country has advantage in military pro…ciency. We show that when both countries are unconstrained no player has an incentive to declare war, no matter how high the military pro…ciency of the rich country is. When both countries are constrained, in some cases, the rich country would have an incentive to declare war but there is a transfer that will avoid war.
Consider a CSF of the following form It reduces to the form postulated in Section 3 when = 1. We assume 1 because in many cases, war pro…ciency is positively correlated with relative wealth, i.e. countries that are good at producing wealth are also good at producing weapons.
Expected payo¤s for Players 1 and 2 when war is declared are
(V k(e 1 + e 2 )) and E 2 = e 2 e 1 + e 2 (V k(e 1 + e 2 )):
From the de…nition of expected payo¤s we obtain
Solving (5.5) we obtain
Both Players Are Unconstrained
In this case,
These inequalities above can be written as p
Or equivalently,
Expected payo¤s read:
Notice that the total expected payo¤ under war is V =2: So Player 1 has no incentive to declare war because his expected payo¤ is less than V 1 : Player 2 had no incentive to declare war when = 1; so he can not have any incentive to declare war when > 1 because his expected payo¤ is decreasing with :
The following Proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 8. When CSF is of the form (5.1) and both players are unconstrained, peace is an equilibrium outcome in absence of transfers.
Both Players are Constrained
Notice …rst that if Player 1 is constrained, Player 2 is also constrained because > 1;
and V 1 > V 2 : Therefore, if the …rst of the above inequalities holds, both Players are constrained.
The probability of winning for Player 2 decreases with the military pro…ciency of Player 1, so if Player 2 had no incentive to declare war when = 1; he does not have one now.
The probability of winning for Player 1 increases with his military pro…ciency, thus, if the cost of war is not too high relative to the inequality of resources and his military pro…ciency, Player 1 has an incentive to declare war. The following proposition formally states this result. The condition under which Player 1 will declare war follows directly
Proposition 9. When CSF is of the form (5.1) and both players are constrained, in the absence of transfers war is declared by Player 1 if and only if
Player 2 has no incentive to declare war.
In the next proposition we study the possibility of avoiding war by transfers, in this case from the poor to the rich country. We just give a su¢ cient condition that guarantees the existence of a transfer from the poor to the reach that avoids war. The su¢ cient condition guarantees that after the transfer both players still constrained.
Proposition 10. When CSF is of the form (5.1), both players are constrained, and (5.13) holds; a peace agreement is feasible if
14)
The minimal transfer,T ; that avoids war is such that makes Player 1 be indi¤erent between war and peace.
To complete the analysis of this asymmetric case, we would need to study what will happen in the situation where Player 1 is unconstrained and Player 2 is constrained.
The analysis of this part is more complicated, and we believe that will not bring any new insights. What is important in the analysis of the asymmetric case is the fact that it is the rich country that has an incentive to declare war, and that a transfer from the poor to the rich avoids war.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a model of war where players are rational, information is complete and there are no binding agreements. We have shown that war can be avoided by transferring resources from one player to another in a variety of cases: from the rich to the poor player (Sections 3 and 4) or from the poor to the rich player when the military pro…ciency of the latter is high (Section 5).
Clearly, our model is very simple. In order to have a broader picture, other factors like dynamics, heterogeneous resources, asymmetric information and risk-averse players should be considered. 14 Other functional forms of CSF and the cost of war should be 1 4 In games with incomplete information, transfers may signal a "chicken" attitude of the prey so they may exacerbate the demands of the predator and make war inevitable. We do not discuss whether this e¤ect exists. We just point out that, at least in some cases, there is also a good side of "being chicken"
namely that an increase in the wealth of our enemy may make it less aggressive. tried as well. Also, the role of the characteristics of the population and its in ‡uence in the con ‡ict should be considered'see e.g. Esteban and Ray (1999) . A more challenging extension would be to consider more than two countries, i.e. a "region", and to look for the transfers that maintain peace in the region, see Piccione and Rubinstein (2004) for a similar problem. Other mechanisms of appeasement, like trade treaties or technology transfers should be studied as well. 15 In any case, the mechanism considered here looks very basic because it works through the e¤ect of transfers on the incentives of countries.
Therefore, it is likely to be present in similar models.
7. Appendix. . Thus the constraints for T 0 are
since k < 1; so T 0 can be chosen between these bounds. Furthermore, since 1 4k
; T 0 <T and thus
We …nally show that T 0 can be chosen such that k
; and since k < 1; T such that after the transfer both players are constrained. Then, a peace agreement is also feasible with a transfer T 0 <T such that only Player 2 is constrained.
Proof. Since k 2 (0; 0:5); min(
can be chosen between these bounds. 1 5 For instance, the rich country can partially destroy its own resources without transfering them to the poor. This mechanism is less powerful than the one considered here because it a¤ects relative wealth only by making the rich country less rich and not by making the poor country richer. But it may work in cases in which, by whatever reason, the poor could not receive transfers.
Furthermore, since k < V 2 +T V and V 2 +T 0 V < k; T 0 <T and thus
V k: We …nally show that T 0 can be chosen such that k
Thus, choosing T 0 such that
' k will satisfy the desiderata.
Lemma 3. If before the transfer war occurs, k
Proof. Since war occurs,
; the maximal value in the relevant interval is reached at
Proof. Let
It is straightforward to see that x 1 (k) so de…ne is a solution of the equation
which is a contradiction. Therefore,
Notice …rst that if k 2 [0:5; 1);
k: By Lemma 3 a peace agreement in this case is feasible if and only if
There is a solution x 0 (k) of equation
3)
It is straightforward to see that x 0 (k) so de…ne is a solution of the equation 
x 0 (k); a peace agreement is feasible.
Proof. Since kx + 2 p xk is increasing for all x 2 [0;
; condition (7.2) is satis…ed, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible.
is increasing for all x 2 [0;
2) is satis…ed, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible. Proof. Clearly, if
: Thus, condition (7.2) is never satis…ed.
Secondly, notice that if k 2 (0; 0:5);
: By Lemma 3 a peace agreement in this case is feasible if and only if
It is straightforward to see that x 2 (k) so de…ned is a solution of the equation 
Proof. Since k (1+k) 2 < k for all k 2 (0; 0:5) and kx + 2 p xk is increasing for all
Lemma 12. Let k 2 (0; 0:5): If
, a peace agreement is feasible.
is satis…ed, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible.
V k; thus condition (7.4) is satis…ed, and therefore, a peace agreement is feasible. Proof. Clearly, if
Proof of Proposition 3. If k = 1; notice that it is impossible to be in Case 3.2 or in Case 3.3 after the transfer, so we are left with Case 3.1 as the only possibility for achieving peace. Then, conditions 1, 2, and 3 read
V . It can be easily shown that for
Thus, the transfer that brings peace exists if and only if is feasible if and only if
The minimal transfer needed is such that
Notice that for such a transfer Player 2 is indi¤erent between war and peace, since forT
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider the second stage of the game where war would be declared when no transfers are made, but that a transferT such that V 2 +T = V =2(1 + ) has been made. After the transfer, payo¤ for Player 1 in case of peace is:
Assuming that this payo¤ is less than in the case of a war with no transfer,
which is impossible. Thus,T yields an incentive for peace for both players. It is only left to show that after the transfer, Player 1 is not constrained, which amounts to
, k 2 + 1 :
By the previous Proposition, if the relatively poor player had an incentive to go to war before the transfer, < k. But then, k > > 2 +1 , as desired.
Proof of Proposition 6.
In what follows we developed the necessary steps to prove the Proposition
Step 1. Let T be the minimal transfer that makes Player 2 indi¤erent between war and peace,
Let us see that T exists and V 2 + T < V =2:
Since both players are constrained and war holds, V 2 is such that
(1 k): Step 2. Player 2 is better o¤ with the transfer.
Since the probability of winning for Player 2 is increasing with V 2 ;
(1 k) = V 2 + T: (7.11)
Step 3. Both players still constrained after the transfer.
Clearly, if Player 1 was initially constrained, he is also constrained after the transfer.
Furthermore, since V 2 +T V =2 and Player 1 is constrained, Player 2 is also constrained.
Step 4. Neither Player 1, Player 2, has an incentive to declare war after the transfer.
Since both players are constrained, in case of war the expected utility of Player 2 is (V 2 + T ) (V 1 T ) + (V 2 + T ) V (1 k): (7.12) and by the de…nition of T (7.9), Player 2 does not have an incentive for going to war.
Neither does Player 1 by the same argument as before the transfer.
Step 5. Player 1 will be better o¤ after the transfer if
Proving inequality (7.13) is equivalent to proving that
V (1 k): (7.14)
(1 k): (7.15)
Since T is such that (V 2 +T )=V = x 0 where x 0 is the …xed point of f (x) = x (1 x) +x (1 k) in [V 2 =V; 1=2]; proving (7.15) is equivalent to prove that
(1 k): (7.16) Let V 2 (k; ) be de…ned as follows:
(1 k) if x 0 > k : (7.17) Notice …rst that whenever x 0 > k; and given that x 0 is the …xed point of f (x); the value V 2 is well de…ned. Thus, Player 1 will be better o¤ after the transfer whenever
Proof of Proposition 7. The expected value for Player 2 in case of war is given by E 2 = V 2 ( e 1 ) + V 2 (V k( e 1 + V 2 )):
Since e 1 is the solution of equation (4.17), V 2 ( e 1 ) + V 2 (V k( e 1 + V 2 )) = k e 1 : (7.19) Thus, Player 2 will have incentives to declare war whenever k e 1 = > V 2 :
Let us see under what condition this inequality holds:
Consider the following function:
F (e 1 ) = V 2 (e 1 + V 2 ) (V k(e 1 + V 2 )) ke 1 :
This function is decreasing in e 1 and in the optimal e¤ort of Player 1; e 1 ; F ( e 1 ) = 0:
Thus, e 1 > V 2 =k if and only if F ( V 2 =k) > 0:
From the above inequality it follows that F ( V 2 =k) > 0 if and only if It is easy to see that
; is equivalent to 21) or equivalently to G( ;
; where G( ;
Let us see that we can …nd a transfer from Player 2 to Player 1 that avoids war.
Consider the following picture where x V 2 V (this is the case for = 2 where G(2; x) = x + (2=x) 2) and clearly G(2; x) < (2=x)). The thick line correspond to clear is whether he will accept the transfer. So, we have to see that
): (7.22) The left hand side is clearly increasing in V 1 ; thus
Finally, let us prove that Player 2 is also better o¤. So we have to compare the payo¤s of player2 at x 0 = V k ( 1) with the payo¤s should a war arise,
. What we want to prove is that
Notice …rst that when ! 1; the left hand side tends to zero and the right hand side tends to k. Secondly, when ! 1; the left hand side tends to V 2 (1 k) and the right hand side tends to 1: Thus, if the inequality were the other way around for some value of there must be, generically, two positive solutions to the equation
. It is easy to see that this equation has, at most, one positive root. Thus, there must be a contradiction.
